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Maintaining operations under Section 165(2a) no. 3 TKG: recovery and backup power

Section 165(2a) no. 3 of the German Telecommunications Act (TKG) requires telecom providers to take measures to maintain operations, such as backup management and recovery after an emergency, and crisis management. The catalogue of security requirements in force (version 2.0) sets this out in more detail with protection against power failure, an emergency manual, backups, recovery procedures and emergency exercises. This page shows what of that applies in a telecom network and what a recovery plan looks like.

Battery cabinet and backup power distribution in a network node in subdued light, a few status lights in warm gold

Last updated: 2026-11-06

Legal status: German Telecommunications Act (Telekommunikationsgesetz, TKG) as amended on 22 October 2026, catalogue of security requirements version 2.0 of 29 April 2020, checked on 6 November 2026. This page looks in depth at one of the ten minimum measures. The overview of all of them is on the page protective measures under Section 165 TKG. This is general information, not legal advice. Whether and how a duty applies to your company is a question for a lawyer admitted in Germany. Quotations from German statutes and from the catalogue of security requirements on this page are our own unofficial translations. Only the German text is legally binding.

What does Section 165(2a) no. 3 TKG require?

The provision names three elements: “maintaining operations, such as backup management and recovery after an emergency, and crisis management”. It applies to operators of public telecommunications networks and providers of publicly available telecommunications services that are essential or important entities under Section 28 of the BSI Act (BSIG), which in our reading means practically every telecom provider (classification on the page NIS2 for telecom providers). Subsection 2a also requires an all-hazards approach that protects the physical environment of the systems as well. Power failure, fire, flooding and cable damage are therefore covered just as much as a cyber attack.

Two other subsections of Section 165 have supported this for some time. Under subsection 2, network operators and service providers must protect their systems against disruptions that lead to considerable impairment, including disruptions caused by attacks and disasters. Under subsection 5, every network operator must ensure the proper operation of its network and so the continuous availability of the services. Separately, Sections 184 to 190 TKG govern emergency preparedness in telecommunications for large-scale emergencies. Its duty to ensure services under Section 185(1) applies to service providers with more than 100,000 contracting parties and to the network operators whose network is needed for these services.

What does catalogue 2.0 in force require?

Chapter 3 of catalogue 2.0 is mandatory for all obliged companies. Four sections are relevant to maintaining operations:

SectionRequirements (in short)
3.3.3 Security of supplyprotect equipment and resources against power failures and other disruptions; redundant lines over different supply routes; dimension and monitor air conditioning and power supply adequately; check switchgear, backup generators and batteries regularly and test them where possible; protect the delivery and provision of supplies
3.6.1 Business continuity managementemergency manual with current contacts, ensure access to it; appropriate redundancies, tested or switched over regularly; regular backups of critical systems and data, observing deletion and retention periods; emergency plans for critical systems, evaluated regularly; appoint an emergency officer
3.6.2 Disaster recovery managementprocedures for restoring important services as fast as possible; prioritise business processes for recovery; check supplier contracts for replacement supply; spare equipment and, in individual cases, mobile backup power units as possible measures
3.7.2 Emergency exercisesexercise regularly, with third parties where possible, using realistic and varied scenarios; record whether planned downtimes are met and whether crisis management fulfils its tasks

Catalogue 2.0 also grades networks and services by criticality. Above 100,000 subscribers it presumes elevated criticality. Measures against considerable disruption from natural disasters, serious accidents, sabotage and terrorist attacks are then added, expressly including emergency preparedness measures. Most regional providers are below this level.

Diagram “Maintaining operations in catalogue 2.0” in three columns. Column 1 “Prepare”: protection against power failure, redundant supply lines, check and test backup power systems regularly (section 3.3.3); emergency manual, redundancies, regular backups, emergency officer (section 3.6.1). Column 2 “Recover”: procedures for the fastest possible restoration, prioritise business processes, spare equipment and replacement supply (section 3.6.2). Column 3 “Exercise”: regular emergency exercises with realistic scenarios, also with third parties, check downtimes and crisis management (section 3.7.2). Below the columns a band: legal basis Section 165(2a) no. 3 TKG, maintaining operations, backup management, recovery after an emergency, crisis management.
Tap the graphic to open it at full size.Maintaining operations under the catalogue in force. Source: Section 165(2a) no. 3 TKG as amended on 22 October 2026; catalogue of security requirements version 2.0 of 29 April 2020, sections 3.3.3, 3.6.1, 3.6.2, 3.7.2; own illustration, as of 6 November 2026.

What would draft version 2025-10 change?

The draft of the new catalogue (version 2025-10) has not been adopted (as of 6 November 2026), and catalogue 2.0 continues to apply. The draft would grade the requirements by a new threat potential in three levels, with measures in categories a), b) and c). This classification does not apply today (details on the page catalogue of security requirements under Section 167 TKG). For maintaining operations, these points would be new above all:

Section in the draftCategory a)Category b)Category c)
4.4.2 Security of supplysecure deliveries relevant to security of supplydefine to what extent operations must be maintained if the public power grid fails; protect the supply, for example with backup batteries, diesel generators, reserve fuel; take into account the guideline “Notstromversorgung in Unternehmen und Behörden” (backup power supply in companies and public authorities) of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK)active cooling, backup generators, service level agreements with fuel suppliers, redundant cooling and power supply
4.8.1 Strategy and emergency plansstrategy for maintaining networks and servicesemergency plans for all systems relevant to operations, record recovery timesrevise plans after incidents, overview of dependencies relevant to operations
4.8.2 Recoverydocument recovery planning, immediately available in an emergency; document recovery times of the central services and networksemergency manual, regular tests of recovery timesadequately dimensioned disaster recovery capacity
4.8.3 Backup strategybackups “should” be stored physically and logically separated; check regularly that backups workbackups “must” be stored separately; document backup procedures; geo-redundant backup solutionsno further measures

The Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA), the German Federal Network Agency, itself states in the explanatory notes that for companies with normal threat potential the draft still stays below the 3-2-1 rule for backups (three copies, two storage media, one copy off site). For setting up emergency management, the draft refers to BSI Standard 100-4 of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI).

Backup power and network outages: what matters in a telecom network

Catalogue 2.0 requires protection against power failure, but no particular technology and no minimum runtime. How long a network node has to run without mains power is something you set from your risk analysis. From category b), the draft would expressly require this extent to be defined. In our professional view, planning should cover:

  • Runtimes per site: How long do batteries bridge network nodes, distribution points and the core network? Is there a generator or a connection point for a mobile backup power unit?
  • External dependencies: Customers' terminal equipment runs on household power. In a wide-area power cut, the customer side is disconnected even if the network node keeps running. This belongs in communication with customers and authorities.
  • Cooling: If the equipment runs on backup power but the air conditioning does not, temperature limits the runtime.
  • Fuel and access: Who refuels a generator after how long, and who can get into the site during a power cut if the locking system is electric?
  • Testing under load: Catalogue 2.0 requires backup power systems to be checked regularly and tested where possible. A test without load says little about the actual runtime.

In a telecom network, backup is about more than servers. Configurations of routers, OLTs and session border controllers, the provisioning of customer lines and the customer database all have to be restorable after an outage or an attack. Whether an outage has to be reported as a significant security incident is explained on the page incident reporting under Section 168 TKG. If remote maintenance is the only way to reach the network elements in an emergency, it belongs in the plan too, see access to network elements.

Example: recovery plan for the telecoms arm of a municipal utility

Fictitious example, not a client. Alongside electricity and water, a municipal utility (Stadtwerk) runs a fibre network with around 6,000 connections. The equipment sits in two network nodes, the core network and the customer systems in the utility's data centre. The telecoms arm offers internet access and telephony itself. Scenario: power cut in the supply area, network node 1 is running on battery. The recovery plan could look like this, all figures invented:

PriorityService or systemDependencyRecovery time (target)Measure in an emergencyResponsibleLast test
1Core network, routing, connection to the upstream providerdata centre power, transitkeeps running, outage under 15 minutesgenerator in the data centre, second transit routehead of network operationsload test 04/2026
2Network nodes 1 and 2 (OLT, aggregation)battery, no generatorbattery 4 hours, then mobile backup power unitrequest the backup power unit after 2 hours, connection point in placeon-call dutybattery test 02/2026, backup power unit never connected
3Telephony (session border controller, emergency call routing)core network, upstream telephony providerunder 1 hourswitch over to second instancehead of ITswitchover 06/2026
4Configurations of the network elementsbackup server, off-site copyrestore under 2 hours per devicerestore from the last daily backuphead of ITrestore 05/2026
5Customer management, provisioning, fault reportingdata centre, customer service phone system8 hoursfault announcement, emergency operation with a paper listcustomer servicenot tested

The plan also sets out the emergency officer and their deputy, the crisis management team with contact details, a printed copy of the emergency manual in both network nodes, and communication with customers and the Bundesnetzagentur. Rows 2 and 5 show the open points, and the next exercise should start there. The other divisions follow their own rules: the power grid falls under Section 5c of the Energy Industry Act (EnWG) with the IT security catalogue, the drinking water supply in our reading under the BSI Act, see municipal utilities with a telecoms arm.

Three typical gaps

GapCauseEffectRemedy
Backup without a restore testbackups run automatically, nobody has practised restoring themin a real emergency, keys, software or time are missing and the backup does not helptest restoring each class of system at least once a year and record how long it takes
Backup power never tested under loadbatteries and generator have been in place since construction, maintenance without a load testthe runtime in the plan is an assumption, while catalogue 2.0 requires checks and, where possible, testsschedule a load test and check cooling and access to the site at the same time
Emergency manual only on the networkthe manual sits on the file server or in the wikiduring a power cut or an attack it is unavailable exactly when needed, while catalogue 2.0 requires access to it to be ensuredcurrent version printed at the sites and offline with the emergency officer

If you want to know where your company stands on the ten minimum measures as a whole, start with the status review (stage 1). We have acted as security officers under Section 166 TKG and have drawn up and updated security concepts and agreed them with the Bundesnetzagentur.

Frequently asked questions

Do I need a backup generator for every network node?+
Catalogue 2.0 requires equipment to be protected against power failures and names backup generators among the systems to be checked, but prescribes no particular technology. How long a site has to run without mains power follows from your risk analysis. From category b), draft version 2025-10 would require protective measures such as backup batteries or diesel generators, and in category c) also backup generators with service level agreements for fuel.
How often do backups and backup power have to be tested?+
Catalogue 2.0 says “regularly” and sets no interval. Our professional recommendation is to test restoring and backup power at least once a year and to record the result, and critical systems more often.
Is the 3-2-1 rule for backups enough?+
Catalogue 2.0 requires regular backups of critical systems and data without prescribing a rule. The 3-2-1 rule goes further, and the Bundesnetzagentur calls it generally accepted best practice in the explanatory notes to draft version 2025-10. What also matters is that the backups can actually be restored.
Does a network outage have to be reported?+
That depends on whether the outage is a significant security incident under Section 168 TKG. The criteria and deadlines are explained on the page incident reporting under Section 168 TKG. This has to be assessed case by case.
Who is responsible in an emergency?+
Catalogue 2.0 requires a suitable emergency officer who knows and steers all emergency management activities. This role is separate from that of the security officer under Section 166 TKG, but in small companies the same person can hold both. More on the role on the page security officer under Section 166 TKG.

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Sources

This content provides general technical and organisational information and does not constitute legal advice (no legal services within the meaning of the German RDG).